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INTRODUCTION 
The occupation of Haiti in September 1994 by a US-led force has helped to 
answer some questions, but it has left many more unresolved. The 
uncertainty surrounding President Clinton's willingness to use US troops on 
foreign soil may have been lifted, but it remains very unclear how long the 
occupation will last and what objectives can realistically be achieved. 
The unfolding of the Haitian crisis after the military overthrow of President 
Aristide in September 1991 has had many dimensions. The US desire not to 
be seen to be acting unilaterally has drawn in both the Organisation of 
American States (OAS) and the United Nations (UN), but the ability of these 
multilateral organisations to act independently of US policy in the Haitian 
crisis has been called into question. The UN trade embargo against Haiti has 
raised traditional concerns over both its legality in international law as well 
as its effectiveness as an instrument of foreign policy. 
No trade embargo can function without the support of neighbouring 
countries. In the Haitian case this has meant the Dominican Republic, whose 
relationship with its western neighbour in the island of Hispaniola has been 
marked by tension and suspicion ever since the Dominican Republic gained 
independence from Haiti 150 years ago. Yet the Dominican Republic has had 
its own share of problems in the last few years, culminating in the recent 
presidential elections (May 1994) widely condemned as fraudulent. 
There is now a chance for the return of Haiti to the democratic fold. Yet 
questions remain not only over the viability of democracy in Haiti, but also 
over the treatment of those guilty of human rights abuse and military 
intervention. The issue of impunity, controversial in many Latin American 
countries, is clearly of particular importance in Haiti. 
As a contribution to our understanding of all these unresolved questions, 
the Institute of Latin American Studies is publishing two papers on the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti and the United States. The first, by Andre Corten, 
looks at the complex web that has bound the three countries together in recent 
years through migration, trade and domestic politics. The second, by 
Federico Andreu, tackles the thorny issue of impunity in Haiti and the 
response of the international community. Both papers were given as seminars 
at the Institute of Latin American Studies in early 1994 and have been revised 
to take into account recent developments. 
Victor Bulmer-Thomas 
Institute of Latin American Studies 

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC ELECTIONS 
AND THE UNITED NATIONS EMBARGO 
AGAINST HAITI 
Andre Corten 
The most recent of many crises in 'Hispaniola', the Caribbean island 
uncomfortably shared by Haiti and the Dominican Republic, began with the 
military overthrow in September 1991 of Jean Bertrand Aristide, the 
democratically elected Haitian President. Subsequent unsuccessful efforts by 
the Organisation of American States (OAS) to restore democracy led to 
greater involvement by the United Nations (UN) and the imposition of a UN 
trade embargo. In order to ensure compliance with the embargo, the support 
of the Dominican Republic was essential. As a result, fraudulent presidential 
elections in May 1994 aimed at extending the mandate of President Joaquin 
Balaguer have not been denounced by the international community with the 
vigour that might otherwise have been expected. The crisis has thus affected 
the whole island and the occupation of Haiti in September 1994 by a 
multinational force dominated by the USA still leaves many questions 
unanswered. 
Although the embargo was imposed by the United Nations, the dispute has 
only three main players: Haiti, the United States of America and the 
Dominican Republic. In a brief period in 1994, the triangular Haitian-
Dominican-US relationship experienced several changes of which perhaps the 
first is the most important. On 8 May, President Clinton announced the short-
lived end of the 'repatriation' of the Haitian boat people;1 on 16 May the 
Dominican Republic elections took place in the usual atmosphere of fraud; 
on 22 May resolution 917, for a 'total commercial embargo' against Haiti, 
which had been voted for by the United Nations Security Council on 6 May, 
came into effect; on 25 May, at the instigation of the United States, President 
Balaguer, who had always described the embargo as inhuman, began to 
respect it; on 10 June the US administration adopted new sanctions against 
Port-au-Prince, the banning of commercial flights leaving for and coming 
from Haiti, the freezing of any financial transaction above $50 and the threat 
of a 'surgical' military intervention. Finally, on 18 September, following a 
last-minute agreement brokered by ex-President Carter, US troops occupied 
Haiti peacefully. 
The proximity of these few dates encapsulates the deep US-Dominican-
Haitian entanglement. Apparently, the United States can only solve the 
Haitian question with the co-operation of the Dominican Republic. Some 
observers even thought they had discovered a 'secret pact':2 the Clinton 
administration would close its eyes to the electoral fraud in exchange for 
which the Dominican Republic would close its border and enforce the UN 
embargo. This hypothesis is based on two assumptions. The first is that 
Washington believed and hoped that the embargo would have an effect. The 
second is that the United States prefers the support of President Balaguer to 
other possible Dominican Republic leaders. 
We will examine successively the points thus raised. First, the two 
elements of the so-called 'secret pact': on the one hand the electoral fraud, 
and on the other the major role played by the Dominican Republic in 
implementing the embargo. Afterwards the two assumptions will be explored. 
It will be found that these four elements are inter-linked by an underlying 
factor: the political role (active or passive) of Afro-Americans as much in the 
United States as in the Caribbean. 
The Electoral Fraud 
Electoral fraud is common in the Dominican Republic political system. It was 
during the dictatorship of Trujillo that elections took place 'regularly' every 
four years. These had already allowed Balaguer to be elected President under 
the reign of the 'Benefactor' (1930-1961). Since 1966, every election has had 
complaints of serious fraud lodged with the Junta Central Electoral (JCE). 
Two of these elections - 1970 and 1974 - were boycotted by the Partido 
Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), the main opposition party (see Table 1). 
In 1978, the military positioned themselves in the streets of the capital city, 
Santo Domingo, whilst the count of the vote was interrupted. Intervention by 
President Carter was needed for the PRD to be recognised as having won. 
Table 1 
Results of Presidential Elections 
1962 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1994* 
PRD 
PRSC 
PLD 
58.72 36.76 
56.48 
np 
52.78 
np 
84.67 
51.69 
42.17 
1.11 
46.70 
36.55 
9.82 
36.46 
41.56 
18.37 
23.23 
35.06 
33.81 
41.42 
42.05 
13.16 
* Preliminary breakdown given to the press by the JCE. 
Source: For 1962-1990, Corten (1993), El Estado Debil: Haiti y la Republica Dominicana 
(Santo Domingo: Edicion Taller). 
The present situation, however, is closest to that which happened four 
years ago. In 1990, the Partido de la Liberation Dominicana (PLD), led by 
ex-President Juan Bosch,3 which had been ahead by nearly ten points in pre-
election polls, found itself denied victory by a 'colossal fraud'. The JCE 
decreed on 27 June that outgoing President Balaguer had won by a margin of 
24,000 votes. In 1994, Balaguer, 87 years of age, was again behind in the 
polls for more than a year. This time, however, it was the 'young' Pena 
Gomez, aged 57 and already a veteran of Dominican politics as the leader of 
the PRD, who saw victory denied by a handful of votes (see Table 1). The 
preliminary results gave41.42% to Pena Gomez, against 42.05% to Balaguer 
with the process being interrupted after 97% of the vote had been counted. 
The PRD held evidence of irregularities which the Rector of the University 
of Santiago, under whose auspices a 'pact of civility' had been signed, took 
seriously. Meanwhile, the fact that Balaguer had agreed to partial new 
elections if the need arose suggested that he had the means to ensure that 
these would not affect the final result. 
This proved to be the case. The final result, which had to be announced 
before 16 August (the constitutional date for the investiture of the new 
President), gave Balaguer's Partido Revolucionario Socialista Cristiano 
(PRSC) a small margin over his main rival. The poor showing of the PLD 
was confirmed (Juan Bosch had already resigned4). There was little 
confidence inside or outside the Dominican Republic that the elections had 
been fair and Balaguer was only able to continue in office after reaching an 
agreement with Pena Gomez that new elections would be scheduled for 
November 1995 in which the President would not stand.5 This would be one 
month before the elections that are supposed to be held in Haiti. 
Several pre-election polls are available to show the electoral balance before 
the 1990 and 1994 elections (see Table 2). These polls obviously cannot 
prove that there was any fraud. Indeed, a few days before the election one 
survey gave Balaguer the lead with 38.8% against 37.9% for Pena Gomez,6 
whilst another gave Pena Gomez a slight lead, 37% against 34% for 
Balaguer7. However, we do know that 200,000 voters were deleted from the 
electoral roll through electronic rigging. This would have happened in the 
areas where the PRD was strongest. The JCE recounted the votes, but - taken 
with everything else - this did not change the fraud.8 
Electoral fraud is common in the Dominican Republic. An opposition 
candidate has no chance of winning unless they have a comfortable lead such 
as was the case in 1978 and 1982, a period when divisions in the opposition 
were less important (see Table 1). However, the analysis cannot be conducted 
purely in electoral terms. There was an unusual factor present in the last 
elections. The candidate of the PRD - Jose Francisco Pena Gomez - is black, 
and is considered as having Haitian ancestors. The electoral campaign was 
therefore marked by unbridled racism. His adversaries accused him of being 
a voodoo follower and of supporting a plan for the merging of the Dominican 
Republic with Haiti - an idea said to have been hatched by the great powers, 
namely the United States, Canada and France. A first stage in this process 
would have been the creation of refugee camps for Haitians in the Dominican 
Republic and a strict application of the UN embargo, which was accepted by 
Pena Gomez, would have promoted a flood of such refugees. 
Table 2 
Pre-election Polls (1989-1990, 1992-1994) 
Jan. 1989 Mar. 1990 Nov. 1992 Sept. 1993 Apr. 1994 
PRD 13 15 37 42 33 
PRSC 24 26 26 35 27 
PLD 34 36 17 15 9 
Polls: January 1989 (Gallup); March 1990 (Gallup); November 1992 (Hamilton); 
September 1993 (Penn and Scroen); April 1994 (Roper). 
The electoral campaign, full of dirty tricks,9 resulted in some thirty 
deaths. Recalling the dark period of 'Balaguerismo' (the beginning of the 
1970s), it was intended to arouse anti-Haitianism with the aim of producing 
a nationalist response. This was linked to rumours about the plan allegedly 
hatched by the great powers. This story, of particular importance to the right-
wing Union Nacionalista, was relaunched five days after the elections, that 
is to say when Pena Gomez as a Vice-President of the International Socialist 
sought the support of his foreign friends to denounce the fraud to the OAS. 
This demonstrated the advantage of an anti-imperialist rhetoric. In the 
absence of a credible claim to have held fair elections, Balaguer and his 
supporters sought refuge in the language of nationalism. In a declaration 
published on 15 June, the US State Department pressed the Dominican 
authorities to take into consideration the fraud allegations. The JCE answered 
that it could not accept orders from any international institution. 
The consequences may be even worse in the long term. Throughout the 
campaign, Pena Gomez presented himself as being as Dominican as his rival. 
Instead of publicly accepting that he really has Haitian blood10, and 
proposing a structured notion of relations between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, namely defining a clear migration policy, he was constantly trailing 
his opponent in a defensive position. Balaguer has for years been presenting 
himself as a follower of Price-Mars11 and a theoretician of Dominican-
Haitian relations - he has written two books devoted to it.12 In particular, 
he defends the argument of a demographic disequilibrium between a country 
of an Ethiopian race (Haiti) and that of a 'white' race13 and warns against 
a peaceful invasion through migration. At the same time, it was during his 
last mandates that the Dominican economy came to rely most heavily on the 
cheap Haitian labour force.14 A myth is therefore emerging that, in common 
with all myths, is so constructed to absorb opposing arguments in all 
cases.15 A simple defensive position against this myth can, as a result, 
reinforce it. Involuntarily, Pena Gomez gave the opportunity for a 
strengthening of anti-Haitianism. 
The Embargo 
The embargo16 was decreed for the first time by the OAS the day after the 
coup d'etat of 30 September 1991. It was confirmed in November 1991, after 
long hesitation, and was reconfirmed in October 1992. It was adopted by the 
Security Council on 16 June 1993, lifted after the Governor's Island 
agreement (see below) on 3 July and reimposed on 18 October. It was 
reinforced by Resolution 917 of the UN Security Council on 22 May 1994. 
In accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, these 
embargo measures were accompanied by a naval blockade that was enforced 
by twelve ships (mainly US but also French, Canadian and Argentine). This 
blockade intercepted 1,005 ships and turned away 81. In the first week of the 
latest sanctions (22 May 1994) nine ships were able to enter Haitian ports, 
but 12 were turned away.17 
Well before the United Nations resolutions, the blockade had been enforced 
by the US navy in accordance with the 1981 agreement with the Haitian 
Government which allows US coastguards to intercept the Haitian 'boat 
people' on the open sea. Since October 1993, the aim of the blockade has 
remained that of a quarantine line to contain the thousands of escaping 
Haitians so smugglers needed only to avoid the route taken by the emigrants. 
A journalist's report drew attention to the port of Jacmel situated in the south 
of the country.18 Off the migration routes, it is the ideal port for smuggling. 
Local residents pointed out that at least nine vessels docked after the 
intensification of the embargo on 22 May. They were ships sailing under 
British, Jamaican, Colombian, Dominican, Bahamian and Haitian flags. They 
generally arrived by keeping close to the coast from the Dominican Republic. 
In particular, witnesses have seen a ship sailing under the Union Jack making 
return journeys with a cargo of 15,000 gallons of oil. It is this oil that 
ultimately supplied the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince. 
The image of a totally blockaded country does not exactly conform with 
reality. The fact that six versions of the embargo had to be decreed is 
evidence that the previous orders were not respected. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it can be noted that the first measures had a distinct lack of 
concrete content. The most recent resolution, on the other hand, talked of a 
'complete commercial embargo'; yet it was not, as it did not affect essential 
foodstuffs and medical or 'humanitarian' products. Also 300,000 gallons of 
petrol for humanitarian organisations were allowed to enter. Electricity was 
rationed and even the favoured residential areas received only two to three 
hours of electricity. However, all firms have generators, as do the wealthy 
households. Finally, estimated inflation rose to an annual rate of 60%. Is this 
an excessive rate for a country allegedly under siege? 
There are, of course, many disturbing figures. Ten thousand have died 
among the most vulnerable groups of the population.19 Haiti is a tragic 
country, the tragedy of the 'development of underdevelopment'.20 The 
embargo puts this horrible reality on public display. The ineffectiveness of 
the embargo is moreover a demonstration of this. Many ships, despite having 
been searched by the US coastguards, continued to trade. Certain prohibited 
products, including petrol, escaped the blockade. In fact, the new embargo 
measures mainly affected the manufacturing industry. It has been calculated 
that 8,000 to 10,000 jobs have been lost. Employers' organisations are 
talking in terms of a disaster. They estimate that since October 1991, 50,000 
jobs have been directly lost and 150,000 indirectly. It is painful for the 
owners to lose workers who are paid 30 cents an hour! 
In fact trade between the United States and Haiti21 has been flourishing 
during this period, even after the October 1993 'severe sanctions' that 
included petrol and weapons. The United States has even increased its 
exports. In January-February 1994 they reached $31 million compared to $26 
million within the same period in 1992.22 From January to October 1993, 
the United States imported 2.5 million softballs and 678,000 baseballs - more 
than the same period in 1992.23 
The image of a total blockade focused attention on the Haitian-Dominican 
border. Since November 199324 questions have been raised about the 
effectiveness of sanctions on the Dominican-Haitian border. At the beginning 
of November President Balaguer confirmed that his country was not violating 
the embargo and would remain loyal to the UN and OAS sanctions 'for as 
long as they did not condemn the Haitian people to hunger' ?5 Journalists 
sent to Dajabon or to Jimani scrutinised (scarcely hidden) contraband. 
Smuggling is an old practice on which Dominican-Haitian relations have been 
forged. Dating from the XVIIth century, it has acquired a special importance 
since 1986.26 Since February 1994, therefore, it has been under a 
magnifying glass. Increasingly detailed and explicit information has been 
collected.27 As a result, it is claimed that it is no longer the traditional illicit 
trade between two countries but is now a large-scale operation. This 
involves, it is pointed out, about twenty tankers per day.28 This operation 
implies not only the tolerance, but also the aid of the Dominican army and the 
support of the President himself. The Dominican army and the Haitian army 
have clearly collaborated in this very lucrative traffic. 
Many supply lines, the workings of wholesale and retail markets, prices, 
bribes for the army and the Chief of Police have been established.29 It is 
even possible to give fairly precise figures. In 1992, the Dominican Republic 
delivered 2,101 barrels,30 in 1993 110,925 and in 1994, 289,305.31 
According to US officials 350,000 gallons a month are estimated to have been 
trafficked.32 'Haiti's imports are from now on going through Saint-
Domingo' noted the President of the Dominican Society of Exporters. 'The 
big Haitian importers of US products have set up in the Dominican Republic 
where they have rented warehouses.'33 It is for internal political reasons, it 
is claimed, that these have not been affected by the UN and US sanctions. 
Also, they openly operate on both sides of the border.34 
Reading the news of the past months, it is apparent that, if the embargo has 
not been respected, it is because of the 240-mile land border with the 
Dominican Republic and because of President Balaguer's refusal to allow it 
to be enforced. The embargo, which was the symbolic weapon of the US 
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), has been neutralised by a President who 
is being questioned, indeed nearly sanctioned, by the international community 
over the 'enslavement' of Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic. It is 
here that Haitian-Dominican relations are again mixed up with the emergence 
of a black political culture. In the United States this took the form of the 
struggle against apartheid in South Africa. When this ended in victory in 
1989, it moved towards the Dominican Republic.35 During the whole 
campaign against slavery, launched in 1979 by the London anti-slavery 
society, but really started at the beginning of the 1990s, it was humanitarian 
organisations36 and certain liberal members of the US Congress who called 
attention to it. Subsequently, the issue was increasingly taken over by the 
Black Caucus. It was a turning point which should be credited to the 
diplomacy of President Aristide. The Black Caucus took note and spoke for 
him. 'The fact that Haiti, as Somalia, represents blacks under a black 
tyranny, signifies that the responsibilities of the Congressional Black Caucus 
are not less but are even greater',37 its President, Major R Owens, declared. 
How does one explain the interest of the CBC in the Haitian question? Two 
complementary hypotheses can be put forward. First, the links established in 
the Haitian community in the United States have made those close to the new 
Democrat administration more aware of Haiti. Secondly, the new 
humanitarian organisations,38 which are often driven by religious groups and 
are engaged in the international campaign against slavery in the Dominican 
Republic, helped to forge the relationship between Aristide and the CBC. 
The CBC is obviously very important to President Clinton, who was 
elected with the help of the black vote.39 In particular, he needs their 
support to pass his domestic programme in Congress. By April 1994 he had 
ceded to the pressure and agreed to strengthen the embargo. It had been 
demanded by Aristide since December and was backed by France. 
The CBC is a lobby unlike any other. Its actions are driven both by culture 
and by politics. It was the hunger strike of the black activist and the respected 
leader of the Trans Africa Forum, Randall Robinson, that gave a new impetus 
to US policy on Haiti. Furthermore, with the proximity of the Dominican 
elections, attention was concentrated on the issue of slave labour in Haiti's 
neighbour. At the end of April, the resignation of Lawrence Pezzullo, until 
then the President's special envoy for Haiti, and his replacement by the black 
William Gray marked the dawn of a new period. This became apparent when 
President Clinton publicly committed himself to an invasion unless the 
Haitian military leadership withdrew. 
Dramatic Choice 
An embargo can only succeed if the country concerned can break the 
determination of its adversaries. President Clinton achieved this by 
brandishing in addition the threat of military intervention. On 19 May 
President Clinton explained the six reasons why he considered Haiti to be 'so 
vital' to the United States. He tried to persuade, in terms dictated by the 
jurisprudence of international law and especially what purports to be the 
'Clinton doctrine', why the United States should prepare itself to intervene 
militarily in Haiti whilst it is reluctant to do so in other parts of the world, 
notably Bosnia. The task was difficult as the President also knew that 68% 
of the US electorate was against intervention. His arguments did not persuade 
Congress. In an 'open vote' on 24 May, it declared itself to be against an 
invasion in the absence of an 'immediate danger' for US citizens and 
interests.40 
It is worth recalling the six reasons given by President Clinton for the 
special importance of Haiti: 
(a) Haiti is in 'our back-yard' 
(b) There are a million US residents of Haitian origin 
(c) There are thousands of US citizens in Haiti 
(d) The country is a centre of drug-trafficking (a reference to one of the 
precedents used for the invasion of Panama) 
(e) It is the only country in the western hemisphere where the military 
has toppled an elected president; with Cuba it is the only non-democratic 
country 
(f) A huge inflow of refugees to the United States must be avoided.41 
The inflow of refugees into the United States seems to constitute one of the 
reasons for the exceptional case represented by Haiti. It is an unprecedented 
case in Latin America for the international community, in fact the 'four 
friendly countries' (the United States, Canada, France, Venezuela - now 
joined by Argentina, to promote the return and restoration of a deposed 
president three years after his being overthrown. 
President Clinton explicitly mentioned the presence of a million Haitian-
Americans in the USA. This figure is far higher than official figures. 
According to the 1990 census, there are only 289,521 Haitian-Americans. 
With regard to illegal immigrants, however, they were estimated as being 
400,000 in 1983.42 
Officially, the number of boat people has risen since November 1991 to 
66,000 in April 1994, that being only 26,000 more than the official figure of 
February 1992.43 This figure is very low if compared with other evidence; 
13,000 people - as many as the four preceding months44 - tried to leave 
Haiti during May 1994 following Washington's announcement that they 
would not be automatically returned to Haiti. The US Senator Bob Braham 
feared a wave of 5,000 to 10,000 refugees a month. Thus, President 
Clinton's figure of one million may not be unrealistic amd the refugee 
question, not surprisingly, is taken very seriously by the administration. 
Faced with the inflow of Haitian boat people, President Bush resolved on 
24 May 1992 in favour of their systematic repatriation. According to the 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), this decision 
violated the Geneva Convention.45 Having criticised forced repatriation 
during his campaign, President Clinton, following his entry into the White 
House, nevertheless altered his views and even succeeded in having this 
radical change endorsed by President Aristide.46 The naval blockade was 
begun to 'save human lives', it was said. It was also claimed in the first 
weeks of 1993 that, as President Aristide was about to be restored, Haitians 
no longer had a reason to leave. 
The growth in terror, particularly after the autumn of 1993, the many 
reported cases of persecution of repatriated boat people47 as well as the 
systematic attack on supporters of Father Aristide by agents of the pro-
military Front pour l'Avancement et le Progres Haitien (FRAPH), gave a 
new vigour to the campaign which has been run since December 1992 by a 
group of humanitarian organisations with the aim of creating a (temporary) 
'safe haven' in the Caribbean basin for Haitians who feel threatened. 
Aristide's letter denouncing the 'refugees' pact', pressure from humanitarian 
organisations that managed to have the accusation of racism aired publicly,48 
the growing pressure of the Black Caucus, and the symbolic action of Randall 
Robinson explain the change in policy on 8 May 1994. 
The human and civil rights lobby has become powerful, but the policy 
shifts it obtains are more than ever tainted by hypocrisy. The Clinton 
administration made a big play of its efforts to incorporate the Turks and 
Caicos Islands and Jamaica in accomodating Haitian refugees. Coming to 
Europe for the fiftieth anniversary of 'D-Day', President Clinton spoke to the 
British Prime Minister John Major about these issues. It involved the hiring 
of two Ukrainian cruise liners, each with 700 berths, to allow the 
accommodation of the boat people during the examination of their claim for 
sanctuary. The health of the concerned countries was guaranteed by the fact 
that the boat people would remain stranded on the boats!49 The UNHCR, 
who were invited to these 'centres', finally refused to separate the 'true' 
refugees from economic migrants. 
If the right of sanctuary to those who are politically persecuted is allegedly 
to be offered, why is it immigration personnel who are used to pursue illegal 
immigrants and not government officials who deal with the right of 
sanctuary? Why is it that the criteria for a request being accepted was very 
restrictive and was limited to either being one of Aristide's colleagues or 
being journalists, when it has been shown that the terror affected those at the 
bottom of society (many living in Cite Soleil)?50 The policies of the Clinton 
administration, accused of being a 'cynical farce' by Aristide as well as by 
members of the Black Caucus, were clearly adopted to gain time. 
The truth is that there is a dramatic choice to be made. Either the USA 
occupies Haiti for long enough to establish the economic and political 
conditions for migration pressures to decline, or it accepts the arrival of a 
hundred thousand Haitians into the USA. This is similar to the number of 
Cubans it accepted in 1981 with the entry of 125,000 Marielitos.51 
Due to the effect of the actions of humanitarian organisations, the 
hypocrisy has been peeled away to bare the racism towards Haitians. That is 
one reason why President Clinton was forced to bring the policy on Cuban 
refugees (mainly white) into line with refugees from Haiti (mainly black) in 
August 1994. This situation gives increasing weight to the actions of the 
Black Caucus. The experts who surround the President know that it will be 
difficult to avoid a huge increase in Haitian migration. The problem is that 
US immigration has known periods of openness (before the first Immigration 
Act of 1882; for people from East Europe after 1948; and for Latin America 
and Asia after 1965) and others of rejection (1882, 1921, 1986).52 Now, a 
policy of closure has been adopted by the Clinton Administration with the 
controls on illegal immigrants being reinforced.53 
Putting Haiti under a Political Embargo 
The US administration, before the occupation in September 1994, constantly 
tried to pass the Haitian burden onto other countries. One need only look at 
the way help was solicited from a number of Caribbean countries to receive 
the refugees: Jamaica, the Bahamas, Belize and of course the Dominican 
Republic. The often-cited figure of a million Haitian Americans mentioned 
by Clinton is intended to explain why the entry of Haitians must be limited. 
The annual quotas are unambiguous on this subject. Only 13,000 Haitians are 
admitted every year. This is half the number for Dominicans (26,000) who 
admittedly may be more numerous on US soil.54 
Whilst brandishing the threat of a 'surgical' intervention, the United States 
tried to incorporate other countries into the United Nations mission which 
should number 3,000 men. At the beginning of the de facto Bazin 
administration (May 1992-June 1993), an agreement was reached on a 
mission of 50 international observers rising later to a force of 200 UN and 
OAS civilians. In accordance with resolution 867 of the UN Security 
Council, adopted following the Governor's Island Agreement (July 1993), 
the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIHA) was increased to 1300 
members with the aim of 'professionalising the army' and creating a new 
independent police force. This force should have disembarked from the 
U.S.S. Harlan County in early 1994, but had to turn back when it clashed 
with a group of pro-military protestors. Today, under the aegis of President 
Clinton's new special advisor, William Gray, it is defined as a 'peace keeping 
force' of 3,000 men (or 'several thousand men').56 'This force should be 
ready to be deployed as soon as the military leaders have left', William Gray 
recently said to the Foreign Affairs Commission. The peace-keeping force 
would have a larger mission than in past agreements, which only foresaw a 
small contingent. This would include police duties until a non-corrupt police 
force has been formed. It would have to protect Father Aristide, the members 
of his government, the members of Parliament, human rights observers and 
humanitarian organisations. It would have to guard foreign embassies. Its 
role would also be to prevent a bloody retribution among Haitians and to 
assure the maintenance of order in the case of a popular uprising.57 
Although France had already confirmed that it would contribute to the 
contingent, the United States tried to convince several other governments to 
participate during the OAS assembly held at the beginning of June in 
Brazil.58 William Gray said that the US request had received a good 
reception from several countries. These countries, however, stated that they 
would participate only on condition that the regime in Port-au-Prince was not 
overthrown by force, a condition that Gray had previously refused to 
accept.59 There are now twelve countries in UNMIHA including Canada, 
Venezuela, Argentina and France (in other words, the countries friendly to 
Haiti). Although US officials are deeply concerned over the length of this 
mission (three to 15 years it is said), it has been established from US sources 
that the 'peace-keeping force could stay until the beginning of 1996, the date 
that marks the end of the Aristide mandate and the inauguration of a new 
President'.60 
Conclusions 
The Haitian political crisis has not only embroiled the United States, but has 
also catapulted the Dominican Republic into a key role on the island. 
Independently of the fact that in international politics there is in general a 
natural inclination to prefer stable situations, there is the question of knowing 
who is the government leader best suited to playing this unique role. One 
cannot help but think of the last pages of his bookIsla al reves where Joaquin 
Balaguer proposes a confederation between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. Paradoxically, the man who has never stopped speaking of a plan 
hatched by the great powers may well be the one who profits the most. Of 
course, it would not consist of a fusion nor of federalism, but of a duo where 
only one of the two can truly act. It is also logical to think that beyond the 
natural preference for international stability, the US administration would 
consider that, whilst not always docile, Balaguer would be their best ally. 
Behind his talk, which borders on racism and chauvinism, Balaguer has an 
idea of his relations with Haiti which his adversaries do not. 
Balaguer's racism has always been modulated. On the assumption of a 
peace-keeping force in Haiti, there will be some Haitians viewed favourably 
by Balaguer, who are assumed to have supported the plans of the 'friendly' 
countries; others, however, will rebel against this semi-protectorate. Not 
having been able to define a clear line vis-a-vis Haiti, Pena Gomez, if 
elected, would not have held a different position. Inexperienced and less 
articulate, he would doubtless be a less certain ally for Washington. At the 
international level, Pena Gomez has not been able to establish himself in the 
US Afro-American political culture that has been reinvigorated because of the 
links woven between Aristide and the Black Caucus. 
The existence of a 'secret pact' is certainly worthy of speculation. 
According to this, the United States would have obtained from Balaguer the 
closure of the border by 15,000 soldiers aided by about thirty United Nations 
inspectors in exchange for recognition of his, possibly fraudulent, re-
election. These speculations, however, are diverting attention away from the 
fundamental variables in the triangular relations between the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti and the USA. Among these, the growing importance of the 
civic and humanitarian lobby must be noted. With this, international policy 
is not only expressed in terms of interests - for example as when President 
Clinton listed the six points why Haiti is 'so vital' to the United States: the 
fight against racism, the protection of refugees' rights, the need to act against 
terror. These values are not necessarily more 'pure'; they essentially express 
the conflicting transnational relations that are being formed within the Afro-
American political culture. 
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THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN HAITI: 
EVIDENCE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
Federico Andreu 
Introduction 
The Haitian crisis, together with the solution prescribed by the so-called 
'international community', has been a test case revealing many of the 
political underpinnings of the new international order. First, it has revealed 
the apparent contradiction between the global agenda of democratisation and 
ihat of maintaining the prevailing balance of power. This contradiction is 
evidenced by the difference between the tenets of international law and the 
policy practice of the international community. The former has taken an 
increasingly firm stance against gross violations of human rights and 
impunity, whilst for the latter impunity has become a necessary element of 
the global process of democratisation. 
At present the concept of democracy is a central element in attempts to 
legitimise the new world order. However, we are not dealing here with an 
abstract or broad concept of democracy, but rather a particular type of 
democracy which facilitates rather than challenges the machinery of 
domination of the new world order, the latter based on the free market and 
global economic integration. So democratisation (according to a particular 
vision of democracy) whilst maintaining the current balance of power are two 
central elements of this new world order. Impunity, therefore, becomes a 
structural element of the new international order and of the ongoing process 
of democratisation; it is neither a temporary nor a local phenomenon. The 
safeguarding of impunity provided by the amnesty laws passed in the Latin 
American Southern Cone during the 1980s provides but one example of this 
problem. 
Secondly, the intervention of the international community in the Haitian 
crisis highlights the way in which international governmental organisations 
act as transmission belts for the foreign policy concerns of the major powers. 
The new world order certainly appears to be based on the geopolitical 
division of the globe into new, regional spheres of influence (with the USA 
dominating the American continent). Undoubtedly the actions of the United 
Nations (UN) and the Organisation of American States (OAS) with regard to 
Haiti were based on US foreign policy concerns, the steps taken by those 
international organisations reflecting the internal contradictions between the 
Republicans and Democrats and between the Pentagon and State Department. 
Historical Background 
On 16 December 1990, Catholic priest Jean Bertrand Aristide was elected 
President of Haiti by 67% of the electorate. He received support from a 
broad range of actors within the popular movement and the left, particularly 
the Lav alas Popular Movement, as well as the grass roots church group 
'tilegliz'. The election of Aristide represented a sharp break with the status 
quo within Haiti and in the Caribbean region in general. For the first time a 
popular movement had won power through the ballot box in a country 
previously ruled by one of the hemisphere's most brutal dictatorships, a 
dictatorship dominated by a particularly rapacious elite, closely linked to 
international capital and supported by successive US administrations. 
There was an important regional dimension to the election of Aristide. 
Because of its proximity to Cuba, Haiti is considered by the Pentagon to be 
strategic for US security concerns. In addition, US economic sectors have 
significant interests in Haiti dependent on tht status quo being maintained. 
For example, a US National Labor Committee report revealed that the 
elevated profits made by US telephone and electronics companies in their 
Haitian assembly plants were principally due to the extremely low salaries 
paid to local workers.1 
The very fact that a left wing government was coming to power in Haiti, 
let alone the potential example set for other Caribbean countries, was 
perceived as a threat to US interests by significant sectors of the 
administration, particularly the Republican Party and the Pentagon.2 
Pentagon officials subsequently told the New York Times that Aristide was 
'suspect and unreliable'.3 On 6 and 7 January 1991 a coup attempt led by the 
ex-chief of the Haitian National Security Volunteers, better known as 
Duvalier's 'Tonton Macoutes', was foiled. On 29 September 1991 a repeat 
attempt by the Haitian armed forces (H AF) overthrew Jean Bertrand Aristide. 
After the military coup, US President George Bush asked the revealing 
rhetorical question 'are the coup perpetrators a real threat to the security, 
foreign policy and economic interests of the United States?', signalling the 
(somewhat cynical) thinking of a key sector of the US administration with 
regard to the crisis in Haiti.4 
The First Actions of the OAS in 1992 
The day after the coup, the Permanent Council of the Organisation of 
American States5 adopted the resolution 'Support to the democratic 
government of Haiti'.6 Besides condemning the coup and reaffirming OAS 
commitment to deepening democratisation across the continent, this 
resolution contained a vital element which would later disappear: the demand 
for punishment of the perpetrators of human rights violations. This was later 
substituted by the demand for an amnesty for the coup leaders. 
During October 1991 the OAS began a process of dialogue with the de 
facto authorities in Port-au-Prince with a view to reestablishing a 
constitutional regime.7 As a means of pressure, the OAS recommended 
diplomatic isolation of the de facto regime and suspension of all financial and 
economic ties until, in the OAS's own words, 'the rule of law had been 
reinstated'. It subsequently decreed an economic and trade embargo and 
created a special civilian mission to work towards reestablishing 
constitutional government.8 
The economic and trade embargo, the only means of pressure brought to 
bear on the de facto authorities, was never fully applied by the member states 
of the OAS. As early as December 1991 President Aristide criticised the fact 
that few countries were supporting the embargo and that former Duvalierist 
leaders and Tonton Macoutes were organising supply shipments from across 
the border in the neighbouring Dominican Republic.9 The President of the 
Dominican Republic, Balaguer, even went as far as publicly to state that he 
was not applying the embargo. Similarly, many of the US firms based in 
Haiti failed to observe the embargo; indeed, they were protected by a 
unilateral exception declared by the US government which allowed them to 
continue assembling and exporting electronic goods to the USA.10 
The Washington Protocols: Imposition of a Model of Democratisation 
The direction of international community intervention in Haiti was clarified 
on 23 February 1993 when the constitutional government and thede facto 
government signed the Washington Protocols under the auspices of the 
OAS.11 Whilst constituting a declaration of intent and a recognition of the 
minimum elements necessary for the reestablishment of the constitutional 
order in Haiti, these protocols were also of overriding importance for the 
transition to or reestablishment of 'democracy' in the country. The 
Washington Protocols laid out the foundations of a concept of transition or 
reestablishment of democracy which we might call democratisation with 
impunity. 
The Protocols consisted of two separate agreements. The first was signed 
by President Aristide and the Presidents of the Haitian Senate and House of 
Representatives, the other by Aristide and the de facto prime minister. Both 
acknowledged the legitimacy of President Aristide and the need to restore and 
consolidate democratic institutions. The Protocols signalled four main stages 
in this process: 
(a) the restoration of President Aristide to his functions (although no date 
was set for this); 
(b) the creation of a government of national consensus and the 
appointment of a new prime minister; 
(c) the consolidation of democratic institutions via legislative reforms, 
particularly the separation and professionalisation of the Haitian armed 
forces and police; 
(d) a general amnesty for the coup leaders. 
The amnesty was defined in very broad terms, the only stipulation being 
that it was not to apply to 'common criminals'. The resulting interpretation 
of the amnesty was exceedingly far-ranging. The Special Rapporteur for Haiti 
of the UN Human Rights Commission defined it as a measure 'to prevent the 
armed forces and security personnel from being accused and judged for 
events during and after the coup of 29 September 1991'.12 
These aspects of the protocols stood in stark contrast to the demands voiced 
by Aristide some days prior to the signing, calling for the immediate removal 
of Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras and the other instigators of the coup: 
'the coup leaders are guilty of crimes against humanity. If democracy is to 
be protected than there are only two possible paths open to them; prison or 
exile'. 
The entire international community backed the Washington Protocols and 
the implied model of transition contained within them (democratisation with 
impunity). For example, the Presidency of the European Commission 
declared itself to be satisfied two days after the Protocols were signed. In 
Haiti, then, the international community sanctioned a model of 
democratisation founded upon impunity. 
Paradoxically, that same year international law made considerable progress 
against impunity. In February 1992 the Human Rights Commission of the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations adopted the Declaration 
on the Protection of all Persons against Forced Disappearance. Article 18(1) 
of this declaration prohibits amnesties for the perpetrators of disappearances. 
On 18 December 1992 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted 
this new instrument of international law.13 The Inter-American Human 
Rights Commission of the OAS, for its part, declared the Argentine laws of 
punto final, due obedience and the presidential pardon of 1989, as well as the 
Uruguayan law setting a cut-off date for prosecution of perpetrators of abuses 
under the previous military government, to be in violation of the Inter-
American Declaration and Convention on Human Rights. The Commission's 
view was that these laws violated the obligation of the state to investigate and 
sanction those responsible for human rights violations and as such constituted 
a denial of justice and the right to effective redress. 
Some days after the Washington Protocols were signed, President Aristide 
spoke before the UN Commission on Human Rights. He stressed the need to 
charge and try the military leaders of the coup in a court of law for crimes 
committed against the Haitian people. This was to mark the beginning of the 
end of the agreements. There were subsequently some fruitless attempts at 
negotiation. The de facto authorities and the military even attempted to 
cobble together an agreement of national salvation based on the exclusion of 
President Aristide.14 In August 1992 a committee composed of members of 
the OAS, European Union, UN and CARICOM (Caribbean Common Market) 
launched an unsuccessful initiative to reopen talks between the constitutional 
president and the de facto authorities. Nevertheless it is important to note that 
the proposal drawn up by the Presidential Commission - advisors to Aristide -
contained most of the points enumerated in the Washington Protocols, bar the 
amnesty.15 
The Caputo Plan and the Governor's Island Agreement 
In late 1992 the UN and the OAS began to cooperate more closely on the 
Haitian crisis. Dante Caputo, formerly Argentine Foreign Minister under 
Raul Alfonsin - the very same administration which had issued the laws of 
punto final and due obedience - was named by the Secretary Generals of the 
UN and the OAS as Special Envoy to Haiti. The UN Secretary General 
designated the United States, Canada, France and Venezuela as 'friendly' 
countries of this initiative. 
The international community then entered into a new phase of intervention 
in an attempt to resolve the Haitian crisis. This intervention slowly took 
shape around the transition set out in the Washington Protocols, with the 
addition of some new instruments. In his March 1993 report to the General 
Assembly, the UN General Secretary wrote: 'the immediate objective is to 
achieve an agreement on three central issues: the return of President Aristide 
to Haiti; designation of a prime minister to lead a government of national 
consensus; and an amnesty'.16 
The Special Envoy duly visited Haiti in April 1993 and presented an outline 
of what was initially known as the 'Caputo Plan'. This included: 
- deployment of a multinational police force, subject to agreement 
between the parties, prior to Aristide's return; 
- appointment of a prime minister by Aristide to be ratified by Congress; 
- the granting of an amnesty and other guarantees to the military coup 
leaders plus the resignation of the army and police commanders; and 
- a programme of financial assistance for economic reconstruction. 
In late June the UN and OAS, via Special Envoy Dante Caputo, presented 
a 'Global Agreement' to President Aristide and Lieutenant-General Raoul 
Cedras, to be signed on 3 July 1993 on Governor's Island by President 
Aristide and the Commander in Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces. At the 
outset of negotiations Aristide demanded the immediate removal of the coup 
leaders and his own immediate return to Haiti. However, he was literally 
forced to sign the agreement.17 This was essentially a reworking of the 
Caputo Plan and included: 
(a) the establishment of a dialogue between the political parties in the 
Haitian parliament with a view to adopting legal reforms to facilitate the 
transition; 
(b) the appointment by the President of a prime minister, to be ratified 
by parliament, then followed by suspension of the embargo; 
(c) separation of the police and armed forces and modernisation of the 
latter; 
(d) amnesty for the coup perpetrators and 'early retirement' for 
Lieutenant-General Cedras and Head of Police Lieutenant-Colonel 
Michel Francois; and 
(e) return of President Aristide by 30 October 1993. 
This process would develop under the auspices and verification of the 
United Nations and the OAS and would receive international assistance in the 
areas of legislative reform, modernisation of the armed forces and separation 
of the police from the military. The agreement postponed Aristide's return 
for nearly another four months. Furthermore, it left implementation of the 
agreements largely in the hands of the coup leaders. In practice this led to the 
absurd situation wherein the armed forces were responsible for the transition 
away from de facto military rule. Soon after the signing of the agreement one 
of the US administration's most effective means of pressurising the Haitian 
military to negotiate - freezing bank accounts and assets abroad and 
prohibiting entry to the USA - was dropped. 
In terms of human rights, apart from the problem of the amnesty, the 
agreement omitted any mention of three central problems: internally 
displaced persons, paramilitary groups and the purging of the army. Another 
difficult question was that of truth; the agreement contained no investigative 
mechanisms, such as a truth commission, which had been features of the 
transition in, for example, the cases of Argentina, Chile and El Salvador. It 
is worthy of note that the Governor's Island Agreement was signed ten days 
after the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna called for 'all laws 
safeguarding the impunity of those who commit serious abuse of human rights 
to be repealed' and reaffirmed 'the duty of states in all circumstances' to 
investigate and sanction those guilty of forced disappearances.18 In these 
terms the Governor's Island Agreement was a major setback, guaranteeing 
as it did the imposition of democratisation with impunity. 
The Special Envoy, MICIVIH and UNMIHA 
With the Governor's Island Agreement, the intervention of the international 
community via the UN and OAS was designed to operate on three levels: the 
international human rights civilian mission, MICIVIH; the military and 
police technical assistance mission, UNMIHA; and the political mission 
under Special Envoy Dante Caputo. This latter was to supervise and 
administer the other two missions. 
The MICIVIH, present in Haiti prior to the signing of the Governors Island 
Agreement, had a mandate to observe, collect information and make 
recommendations on human rights.19 The mission had more than 200 
observers spread across Haiti's nine departments. It's mandate was restricted 
to: the rights to life, safety and physical integrity of the person; of expression 
and association; and furthermore it could only deal with violations committed 
after 9 February 1993.20 Although MICIVIH was granted access to all 
public places and official institutions, in practice the military refused them 
entry to most prisons. 
The technical military assistance mission, UNMIHA, was to have two 
components: police and military. In fact an advance party only arrived on 8 
October. The military component was to provide military training to the 
armed forces and carry out public works (road building and construction of 
medical dispensaries). The second had a mandate to aid the constitution and 
training of a police corps separate from the armed forces. 
The political mission under the aegis of Dante Caputo was the lynchpin of 
US and OAS policy, not only in terms of supervising MICIVIH and 
UNMIHA activities, but also for the purposes of conducting the transition 
process. It drafted proposals for legislative reform in accordance with the 
Governor's Island Agreement: a draft law for the separation of the police 
from the army; a draft law to provide a means of redress to victims of human 
rights abuse;21 and proposals for reform of the judicial and penal system. 
Caputo's advisory team also drew up the text for the amnesty decree that 
President Aristide was committed to sign as part of the Governor's Island 
Agreement. It appears that the political mission submitted four drafts to the 
Haitian President before he issued the final amnesty decree on 3 October 
1993. 
The Failure of the Governor's Island Agreement 
The transition scheme soon went awry. Despite the fact that Prime Minister 
Robert Malval, the President's appointee, was ratified by parliament, and a 
cabinet of national consensus was set up, the constitutional government was 
unable to exercise its functions. The ministers, with the notable exception of 
the Minister of Justice, were unable even to enter their offices. Similarly, the 
Mayor of Port-au-Prince was unable to take possession of his chambers which 
continued to be occupied by the de facto mayor and which were allegedly 
used as a torture centre. 
Although President Aristide complied with the commitments of the 
Governor's Island Agreement, the military not only continued with their 
campaign of repression against all those supporting a return to the 
constitutional order, but from July onwards the repression became both 
quantitatively and qualitatively worse. The disappearance and murder of 
members of the political opposition and popular organisations became 
systematic practice. Paramilitary groups and death squads, organised by the 
armed forces and key Duvalierist leaders, operated throughout the country. 
The objectives of this reign of terror were to prevent the return of Aristide 
and to achieve the incorporation of the Duvalierist political leadership into 
the new government, baptised the government of 'Grand Concorde'. The 
objective of preventing a Lavalas government in Haiti were also the 
objectives of the local economic elite, and of the Republican Party and the 
Pentagon in the USA. As Aristide's position became weaker, the armed 
forces gradually increased the levels of violence in order to test the reactions 
of the international community which significantly failed to react. As the date 
set for Aristide's return approached, the crisis intensified. 
On 11 September 1993, Antoine Izmery, a successful entrepreneur, 
Lavalas leader and opponent of the amnesty, was murdered by a joint 
paramilitary-armed forces commando in front of MICIVIH observers.22 On 
12 September the US troop carrier Harlan County decided not to disembark 
its UNMIHA passengers, instead returning to the United States. It appears 
that the decision not to involve US soldiers at this point in the Haitian crisis 
responded to a previous Pentagon decision, rather than being the result of the 
supposed threat of attack by a hostile crowd gathered on the wharf at Port-au-
Prince. On 15 October the Minister of Justice, Guy Malary, was murdered 
in another commando operation. On 18 October MICIVIH was evacuated to 
Santo Domingo on the direct orders of Dante Caputo. Security concerns for 
the mission were given as the pretext for evacuation. However, according to 
many observers, security problems were never such as to justify the 
evacuation of the mission at a time when its presence was more necessary 
than ever. Certainly to some extent MICIVIH was in conflict with the 
political guidelines of the Special Envoy: whilst Caputo engineered a process 
of transition based on impunity for the coup leaders, MICIVIH increasingly 
condemned the involvement of military and police officers in the repression 
and specifically in the organising of paramilitary groups.23 The 30 October 
deadline for Aristide's return was not met. The CIA launched a campaign of 
defamation against Aristide and many US congressmen questioned his ability 
to rule. It also transpired that the State Department continued to train Haitian 
military personnel despite the official suspension of diplomatic relations.24 
In February 1994, Haitian congressmen supported by the US State 
Department proposed a new plan.25 It consisted of the appointment of a new 
prime minister, retirement of Lieutenant-General Cedras and Lieutenant-
Colonel Michel Francois, and - revealingly - the formation of a broad-based 
government (read 'Grand Concorde') which mentioned no date for Aristide's 
return.26 Aristide refused to sign this proposal. A spokeswoman for the State 
Department said that the US 'regretted' the position taken by the Haitian 
leader. Finally, the agreement brokered by ex-President Carter in September 
1994, as the prelude to the US occupation, made it clear that criminal action 
would not be taken against the Haitian military leaders guilty of human rights 
abuse. 
Conclusion 
In its management of the Haitian crisis the international community became 
the main promoter of a model of transition based on impunity. The 
international community, through the UN and OAS, also served as a vehicle 
for US foreign policy, a policy which had no interest in ousting the coup 
leaders until a regime acceptable to the USA could be secured. It becomes a 
legitimate question therefore whether the UN and the OAS did not in fact 
became a factor directly contributing to the state of impunity in Haiti. 
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